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R. v. Atkinson1
THE ROLE OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
CASE SUMMARY
This case arose out o f a charge o f “corruptly paying a reward to an 
agent as consideration for doing an act related to the business of his 
principal” contrary to s. 383 (1) (a) (i) of the Criminal Code of Canada.2 
The Court of Q ueen’s Bench trial judge, sitting without a jury, found 
the accused guilty and granted him an absolute discharge.3 The New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal dismissed the accused’s appeal from the 
finding of guilty.4
One of the several Grounds o f Appeal submitted by the appellant 
was that “the trial judge, by his questions and remarks during the trial, 
unduly interfered with the conduct of the trial and deprived the accused 
of a fair trial.”5 The alleged interferences included:
1. Asking questions of witnesses which were leading and/or resulted 
in evidence being adduced.6
2. Unnecessary intervention during counsel’s examination of wit­
nesses.7
3. Conducting extensive cross-examination of witnesses after both 
counsel had completed their examinations o f the witnesses.8
4. Interrupting witnesses to express disbelief in their testimony.9
5. Making repeated inquiries o f the Crown as to whether or not an 
investigation o f perjury charges against a witness had been commenced.10
'R. V. Atkinson (1981). 33 N.B.R. (2d) 137 (N.B.C.A.).
%1M., at p. 139.
»See 30 N.B.R. (2d) 649 (N.B.Q.B.).
4 A motion for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court o f Canada was dismissed. R. v. Atkmson (1982),
36 N.B.R. (2d) 358.
'Supra, footnote 1 at p. 163.
•“Appellant's Notice o f Motion” for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court o f Canada, pp. 125 & 126. 
This was in reference to the Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at pp. 189 & 199.
7W ., at p. 128.
•.Ibtd., at p. 129.
•Ibtd., at p. 130.
"Ibtd., at p. 132.
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6. Expressing “wonderment that there is only one accused here in 
this trial”11 during the introduction of documentary evidence and prior 
to any material witnesses being called by the Crown.12
In dismissing the appeal, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal held 
that a trial judge’s “duty to ascertain the truth not only justifies but, on 
occasion, requires judicial intervention” provided such interventions do 
not result in prejudice to the accused.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The role o f the trial judge is probably best described by Denning L. 
J. in Jones v. National Coal Board13 where he stated:
In the system o f  trial which we have evolved in this country, the judge sits to 
hear and determ ine the issues raised by the parties, not to conduct an 
investigation or examination on behalf o f  society at large, as happens, we 
believe, in some foreign countries. Even in England, however, a judge is not 
a mere umpire to answer the question “How’s that?” His object, above all, is 
to find out the truth, and to do justice according to law; and in the daily 
pursuit o f  it the advocate plays an honourable and necessary role.14
In further describing the trial judge’s role, Denning, L. J. stated:
The judge’s part in all this is to harken to the evidence, only him self asking 
questions o f  witnesses when it is necessary to clear up any point that has been 
overlooked or left obscure; to see that the advocates behave themselves seemly 
and keep to the rules laid down by law; to exclude irrelevancies and discourage 
repetition, to make sure by wise intervention that he follows the points that 
the advocates are making and can assess their worth; and at the end to make 
up his mind where the truth lies. If he goes beyond this, he drops the mantle 
o f  a judge and assumes the robe o f  an advocate; and the change does not 
become him well.15
While most authorities recognize the occasional necessity of judicial 
intervention during the course of a trial,16 attempting to draw a line 
between what is and is not permissible intervention is not always easy.17 
Some cases indicate that while a judge may interfere to clarify points, he
"Ibid., at p. 135. This was in reference to the Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 111. 
ltSupra, footnote 1 at p. 168.
'*[ 19571 2Q .B . 55 (C.A.).
,4lbid.. at p. 63.
'*lbid . at p. 64.
•R. v. Denis, [1967] 1 C.C.C. 196 (Que. C.A.); Oguu v. AUt, (1972) 4 N.B.R. (2d) 423 (N.B.Q.B.); R. v. 
Torbuik and Campbell, (1974) 26 CR.N.S. 108 (Ont. C.A.).
,TSee R. v. Pavlukcff, (1953) 17 C.R. 215 (B.C.C.A.).
CASE COMMENTS •  NOTES •  CHRONIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE 261
is not to adduce evidence himself.18 A Judge may remedy a failure on the 
part of counsel to adduce a fact essential to the case.19 However, rather 
than adduce the evidence himself, authorities indicate that “it would be 
preferable . . .  to bring it to the attention o f counsel so that he might 
remedy the deficiency. . .  .”.20
A measure of the amount of interference which is not acceptable 
was stated by Denning, L. J. in Jones v. National Coal Board:
A judge o f  acute perception, acknowledged learning, and actuated by the best 
o f  motives, has nevertheless him self intervened so much in the conduct o f  the 
case that one o f  the parties — nay, each o f  them — has come away complaining 
that he was not able properly to put his case; . . .2l
Case law also indicates that interventions should be as infrequent as 
possible during the cross-examination o f witnesses as it tends to destroy 
the very gist of cross-examination; ie. “the unbroken sequence of question 
and answer.”22
If it should become necessary for a trial judge to interfere during a 
trial, Lord Green M. R. in Yuill v. Yuill has indicated that it is “generally 
more convenient to do this when counsel has finished his questions or is 
passing to a new subject.”23
With respect to comments made by a trial judge concerning the 
credibility of witnesses, Porter, C.J.O. stated, in R. v. Augello and Tascar- 
ella,24
He [the judge] . . . unquestionably has the right in the course o f  his charge to 
the jury to express his views as to the effect o f  the evidence and the credibility 
o f  witnesses, provided that he instructs the jury that they are the sole judges 
o f  the facts and the credibility o f  the witnesses and are not in any way bound 
to accept his views. Nevertheless we do not think it to be in the interests o f a
"T his restriction was approved of in Ogwa v. Alii, supra, footnote 16; see also Bora et al. v. Wenger,
[1942] O.W.N. 185 (Ont. C.A.).
'*R. v. Torbtak and Campbell, supra, footnote 16; Ogwa v. AUt, supra, footnote 16.
*°Ogwa v. Alii, supra, footnote 16 at p. 440. This approach was approved by Dickson. J. o f the S.C.C. in 
his David B. 'Goodman Memorial Lecture, "The Role and Functions of Judges,” (1980) 14 Gazette 138 
at p. 143.
tlSupra, footnote 13, pp. 63 and 64. It is interesting to note that not only did the appellants in the 
instant case complain o f the judge's interventions but so too did the Crown complain, in their appeal 
on sentencing, o f an intervention by the trial judge. See "Appellant's Notice o f Motion” for Leave to 
Appeal to S.C.C. at p. 121.
'Jones v. National Coal Board, supra, footnote 13 at p. 65. Yuill v. Yuill, [1945] I All E.R. 183 (C.A.).
tsYuUl v. Yuill, at p. 185. See also Dickson, J., "The Role and Functions of Judges," supra, footnote 20.
**[1963] 3 C.C.C. 191 (Ont. C.A.); Dickson, J., "The Role and Functions o f Judges,” supra, footnote 20.
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fair trial for the Trial Judge to make statements during a witness’s testimony 
which indicate his disbelief in the testimony being given. Nor should questions 
put by the Judge be so framed as to be open to the criticism o f  unfairness.
Concern over the appearance o f a fair trial was also indicated by Schultz, 
J.A . in Delaney &  Co. Ltd. v. Berry and Berry26 where, in expressing 
disapproval of lengthy examinations of witnesses, he stated,
. .  . [I]f a trial judge examines a witness at length it is often difficult for him 
to avoid the appearance o f  bias or prejudice.*7
The importance of the appearance of an unbiased and fair trial is a 
concept basic to our judicial system. As stated in R. v. Sussex Justices, Ex. 
p. McCarthy:
. . .  a long line o f  c ases shows that it is not merely o f  some importance but is 
o f  fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should 
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.*8
Reflecting the concept of fairness, R. v. Torbiak and Campbell stated:
Since the limits o f  the allowable conduct are not absolute, but relative to the 
facts and circumstances o f the particular trial within which they are to be 
observed, every alleged departure during a trial from the accepted standards 
o f  judicial conduct must be examined with respect to its effect on the fairness 
o f  the trial.*9
It was also indicated in R. v. Pavlukoff30 that, depending upon the 
facts o f a case, “ the c o u rt m ight no t consider th a t the  com ­
ment . . . resulted in any miscarriage of justice and would in consequence 
dismiss the appeal.”31
THE PRINCIPAL CASE
In the instant case, the Court of Appeal, having read the entire 
transcript o f the trial,32 did not take issue with the fact that “a substantial 
num ber o f questions were asked by the trial judge or that remarks were
tllbid., at 192. T he recent case o f Campbell v. R (1981) (N.S.C.A.) (unreported) has indicated that rules 
of conduct for a trial judge set out in cases dealing with jury trials apply just as well to a judge sitting 
without a jury.
*•(1965) 49 D.L.R. (2d) 171 (Man. C.A.).
*7I b i d at p. 174.
*•[1924] 1 K.B. 256 at p. 259.
**Supra, footnote 16 at p. 110.
»•(1953) 17 C.R. 215 (B.C.C.A.). 
s'lbid„ at p. 218.
UR. v. Atkmson, supra, footnote 1 at pp. 163 & 164.
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made by him.”33 However, it held that in light o f a trial judge’s “duty to 
ascertain the tru th”34 and in view o f the circumstances o f the case, the 
appellant was not prejudiced and was therefore not deprived o f a fair 
trial.35
It would appear then, that the C ourt applied the test of “fairness” 
as approved in R. v. Torbiak and Campbell.** The instant court’s final 
statements to the effect that the “evidence is abundant, strong and 
convincing in every respect” and the accused’s guilt was “established 
beyond any reasonable doubt,”37 seems to indicate that the court was 
perhaps also following the “no miscarriage o f justice” doctrine as set out 
in R. v. Pavlukoff !38 It would also appear that the importance of obtaining 
the truth as pointed out by Denning L. J. in Jones v. National Coal Board39 
was underlying the reasoning o f the instant court. In deciding, therefore, 
whether or not the accused’s conviction should be affirmed, the Court 
of Appeal seems to have applied accepted legal principles.
ANALYSIS
Unfortunately the Court of Appeal did not choose to deal with each 
alleged intervention separately making it, therefore, difficult to assess the 
actual basis upon which the court may o r may not have held each 
intervention to be acceptable. It would appear, in light o f the authorities 
previously cited,40 that taken individually, the interventions do not con­
form to what is considered acceptable conduct for a trial judge. However, 
the Court o f Appeal reasoned that:
Upon close scrutiny o f  each alleged intervention o f  the trial judge, in the 
context in which it occurred, as well as upon a consideration o f  their combined 
effect, we are satisfied that they did not result in a "judicial interference 
amounting to prejudicial error.”41
It therefore appears that while, not necessarily approving or disapproving 
of the trial judge’s conduct, it was accepted based on the reasoning that 
no prejudice resulted to the accused.
**Ibtd., at p. 167.
3*lbid., at p. J68.
3llbid., at p. 167.
3tSupra, footnote 29.




4iR. v. Atkinson, supra, footnote 1 at p. 168.
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. Although this was the basic ratio o f the decision, one cannot help 
but take notice o f the reasoning applied in determ ining the issue at hand. 
The Court seems to have placed considerable weight on the fact that:
. .  .this was not the usual trial and that the nature o f some o f the evidence, 
in particular the too obvious and convenient alleged lack o f  memories, were 
at best, frustrating to any fair-minded and experienced trial judge and at 
worse, probable instances o f  peijury.4*
Upon reading this statement, the question which comes immediately to 
mind is; what did the Court o f Appeal mean by the phrase “this was not 
the usual trial”? On the surface, this trial seems to have been a very 
typical criminal trial; ie. it was comprised o f the basic elements o f an 
accused and an offence under the Criminal Code o f Canada. Therefore it 
would appear that the phrase was in reference to the circumstances 
surrounding the case; ie. that it involved employees and members o f the 
Government as well as the finance committee of a political party. If this 
is what was being referred to, one must question whether, the identity 
of persons involved in a trial should be a criteria upon which to decide 
whether or not a trial judge’s conduct deprived an accused o f a fair trial? 
Or, more specifically, should the principles governing the conduct o f a 
trial judge be altered in any respect when the persons involved in the 
trial are Government employees and members of the Legislative Assem­
bly. This proposition would seem to conflict with the basic “Rule of Law” 
established by A. V. Dicey; ie. that every person is equally subject to the 
law.43 This rule was approved o f by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Roncarelli v. Duplessis.44 The rule of law might also be stated in these 
words: the law should be applied equally to all persons. If so, it would 
then appear that the Court of Appeal was incorrect in using the “unu­
sualness” of the trial as a criteria upon which to justify the trial judge’s 
departure from the accepted rules o f conduct.
The sole intervention upon which the Court of Appeal did express 
an opinion was with regard to the trial judge’s remarks concerning the 
credibility o f witnesses. The court expressed doubt that those remarks 
would have been acceptable had the instant case been a trial by judge 
and ju ry .45 This is in keeping with the principles outlined in R. v. Augello 
and Tascarella.46 However, the instant court seems to have ignored the 
effect that such statements might have on subsequent witnesses, regard­
less of whether the trial was by judge and jury  or by judge alone. In a 
case where the events in issue have occurred several years in the past, a
4*Ibtd.. at p. 167.
4S‘‘Administrative Law, Cases, Text, and Materials”; Evans, Janesch, Mullan, Risk; 1980; Edmond- 
Montgomery Ltd., Toronto, Canada.
44[ 1959J S.C.R 121 (S.C.C.).
4*/?. v. Atkinson, supra, footnote 1 at p. 167.
**Supra, footnote 24.
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witness whose memory is not very clear with respect to those events, 
might be intimidated by the trial judge’s verbal expressions of disbelief in 
the testimony of previous witnesses who have claimed a failure of mem­
ory. This is o f particular concern where a trial is as publicized as in the 
instant case. In the interest of obtaining the tru th ,47 therefore, it would 
seem wise to avoid causing undue anguish to subsequent witnesses who 
sincerely may be unable to accurately recall the events in issue.
Expressing opinions as to the credibility of witnesses during their 
testimony may also result in a trial judge having to later reverse his 
opinion should subsequent evidence prove the testimony to be truthful. 
This would lead to awkward situations which should be avoided if at all 
possible.
While the Court of Appeal did not comment upon each of the alleged 
interventions separately, the authorities previously cited48 would seem to 
indicate disapproval in theory, o f the trial judge’s conduct. However, 
with respect to one o f the alleged interventions, there appears to be no 
case law directly on point. This was the intervention made by the trial 
judge after some of the documentary evidence had been presented in 
court and prior to the Crown calling any material witnesses whereby the 
trial judge expressed his “wonderment that there is only one accused 
here in this trial in view of some of the exhibits that we have read.”49 
While this statement may have been “simply an expression of the trial 
Judge’s concern that others should also be on trial,” as the respondents 
suggested,50 and not an indication of a predisposition of the guilt of the 
accused, as the appellants contended,51 it would seem preferable for a 
trial judge to avoid making remarks which might be construed as giving 
the appearance of an unfair trial. This is in keeping with the concept 
stated in R. v. Sussex Justices, Ex. p. McCarthy.52
What then is the effect o f the decision in the instant case? It will 
probably be cited in the future as an application of the law as stated in 
R. v. Pavlukoff, 53 Jones v. National Coal Board54 and R. v. Torbiak and 
Campbell.55 However, because the Court o f Appeal did not specify at
4TThe importance o f this object is stated in Jones v. National Coal Board, supra, footnote 13.
4*See footnotes 13-31.
‘'A ppellant’s Notice o f Motion for Leave to Appeal to the S.C.C. supra, footnote 11.
‘•Respondent’s Submission to the N.B.C.A., pp. 51 & 52.
51 Appellant's Notice of Motion for Leave to Appel to the S.C.C. at p. 135.
4*Note: Sec R. v. Sussex Justices by P. McCarthy, Supra, footnote 28. (In the civil case o f Tecchi v. Cirello,
[1968] 1 O.R. 536 (O.C.A.) where a trial judge definitely did pre-judge the accused prior to the defence
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any point in its judgem ent the actual conduct which it seems to be 
condoning, only those who are familiar with the case will be aware of its 
impact.58
CONCLUSION
It would appear that the New Brunswick C ourt o f Appeal has 
extended the role o f the trial judge to include the previously mentioned 
alleged interventions, provided those interventions have not resulted in 
prejudice to the accused. By so doing, the Court has raised the following 
question: How much further can judicial intervention be extended before 
it will be said that the accused was deprived o f a fair trial or, perhaps 
even more importantly, that our concept of the judicial system as de­
scribed in Jones v. National Coal Board57 has been fundamentally altered? 
The answer to that question will lie within the discretion of the courts 
confronted with this issue in the future. It is therefore disappointing that 
the Supreme Court o f Canada refused the opportunity to address this 
issue by denying the appellant’s application for Leave to Appeal.58 This 
is particularly so in light of the fact that they have yet to provide lower 
courts with guidelines on the role of a trial judge.
CHARITY BUCKINGHAM*
"Because o f the wide spread publicity this trial received, numerous courts are undoubtedly aware of 
ihe conduct in issue.
*B.A., 1974 (U.N.B.), LL.B. Candidate, Faculty of Law, University o f New Brunswick.
17Supra, footnote 13.
“ Supra, footnote 4.
